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Abstract and Keywords
Current research on the origin of DNA and RNA, viruses, and mobile genetic elements 
prompts a re-evaluation of the origin and nature of genetic material as the driving force 
behind evolutionary novelty. While scholars used to think that novel features resulted 
from random genetic mutations of an individual’s specific genome, today we recognize 
the important role that acquired viruses and mobile genetic elements have played in in­
troducing evolutionary novelty within the genomes of species. Viral infections and subvi­
ral RNAs can enter the host genome and persist as genetic regulatory networks. Persis­
tent viral infections are also important to understand the split between great apes and 
humans. Nearly all mammals and nonhuman primates rely on olfaction, i.e., chemorecep­
tion as the basis of the sense of smell for social recognition, group membership, and the 
coordination of organized social life. Humans, however, evolved other means to establish 
social bonding, because several infection waves by endogenous retroviruses caused a loss 
of odor receptors in human ancestors. The human independence from olfaction for social 
recognition was in turn one driver of the rather abrupt human transition to dependence 
on visual information, gesture production, and facial recognition that are at the roots of 
language-based communication.
Keywords: viruses, genetic regulation, genome editors, olfaction, social recognition, group membership
In modern humans, the mind, not the genome, became the substrate for learned 
(acquired) group identity, aided by the development of reading. It is with our 
minds, not our noses, that we learn to belong.
(Villarreal, 2009a)
Introduction
In the first part, I provide a brief outline of the origin of the biocommunication theory that 
is to be situated in the pragmatic turn in linguistics and philosophy of science. I then 
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demonstrate how the biocommunication approach can help explain the origin of sign me­
diated interactions in all three domains of life.
In the second part of this chapter, I focus on how genetic material can be understood as a 
natural code and how viral genes infiltrate mammalian and human genomes. Viral infec­
tions are key players in the evolution of all cellular organisms in general and mammals in 
particular. Endogenous retroviruses in particular have played a crucial role in the evolu­
tion of the placenta, and they are also responsible for the loss of odor, especially in hu­
mans. As we shall see, the latter provides a means to understand the evolution of human 
bonding and social communication in the form of symbolic language.
Example: The emergence of meaning in natur­
al languages
“Anything that can be said can be said clearly” (Wittgenstein, 1922). This is a quote from 
the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico Philosophicus. The book investi­
gated how language refers to the world and how it enables scientific knowledge to be ex­
pressed in a formal, logical language. Wittgenstein tried to find and justify a strict mathe­
matical theory of language, where all sentences of science can be formalized and ex­
pressed as mathematical-like equations. For that reason, he argued that what can be said 
scientifically can be said clearly. Sentences that cannot be formalized are deemed scien­
tifically senseless.
In his later works, Wittgenstein (1953) rejected his earlier ideal of a world-depicting, for­
mal universal language. Instead, he recognized that the basic features of natural lan­
guages are determined by social groups that use a limited repertoire of signs for social in­
teractions. The later Wittgenstein argued it is the social and pragmatic context in which 
the living agent is concretely interwoven that determines the meaning (function) of a 
sign-sequence of a natural language.
This idea marks the pragmatic turn in philosophy of science, of which earlier proponents 
include Charles Sanders Peirce (1923, p. 87), who said that to identify “meaning … we 
have to identify the habits it produces.” Peirce introduced the term semiotics to designate 
the science of signs. He differentiated three classes of sign. Indices point to some object 
in the context in which it occurs, an example being a footprint in the sand. Icons are signs 
that demonstrate similarity with the designated object; think of the image in front of pub­
lic toilets with the different icons of females and males. Symbols, the third class of signs, 
do not depict what they express, for example, the alphabetical letters of a human lan­
guage are symbols for sounds. In pragmatics, the connection between a symbol and its 
meaning does not depend upon the relation between the symbol and the object, but re­
sults from convention-based social learning.
George Herbert Mead demonstrated that meaning (semantics) is a social event, a social 
interaction-derived consensus. This contradicts the core concept of the (coding) sender 
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(and the decoding) receiver narratives (see below) which cannot explain how communi­
cating living agents reach a common agreement on the meaning of signs and the goals of 
cooperation. Later proponents of the pragmatic turn included John Langshaw Austin 
(1975) and John Searle (1976) who developed the speech act theory, as well as Jürgen 
Habermas (1984, 1987) who introduced the theory of communicative action.
Major insights on human language and communication can be summarized in terms of 
the following points (Witzany, 2010a).
• Language is a repertoire of signs that is used by competent agents according to syn­
tactic (combinatorial), pragmatic (context dependent), and semantic (content coher­
ent) rules. Any system that lacks either syntax, semantics, or pragmatic language use 
cannot be defined as language.
• We may differentiate between a linguistic competence (to generate sentences) and a 
communicative competence (to induce social interactions).
• Languages are not sui generis. There must be groups of living agents that share the 
above-mentioned rules and competences in generating utterances using commonly 
shared signs. This means that natural language use is inherently a social event. Think­
ing (in sign-based sentence-like structures) follows the social learning of language and 
not the other way around.
• Language is primarily used for communicative interactions. Communication in every­
day life is not restricted to transfer of factual knowledge about the world. Rather, it as­
sembles all social interactions/knowledge that are mediated by signs. Non-verbal bodi­
ly expressions may also serve as signs, and when combined they too bring forth com­
municative interactions (e.g., gestures, mimesis, or pantomime).
• In addition to denoting various classes of speech acts, natural language is also innov­
ative because it enables the generation of new sequences, new behavior, and new in­
teractional patterns. The results of such innovative speech acts cannot be predicted 
from a complete analysis of former behaviors or former sentences or words, i.e., they 
cannot be computed in principle.
These points about natural language use have now been empirically validated (see Haber­
mas, 1984, 1987; Tomasello et al., 2005) and they contradict the core assumptions made 
by classic theories, including mathematical theories of language that assume that lan­
guage refers to outer objects, as well as its derivatives that include information theory 
(Shannon & Weaver, 1949), systems theory (Wiener, 1948; von Neumann, 1966), and 
Chomsky’s theory (Chomsky, 1964; Nowak et al., 2001) on generative grammar.
In the remainder of this chapter I integrate and develop these insights brought forth by 
the overall pragmatic turn to language and communication.
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cellular, that have a nucleus where genes are organized on chromosomes. Prokaryotes do 
not have nuclei and many are unicellular although they may form colonies and bacterial 
mats.
From archaea, bacteria, and unicellular eukaryotes up to the more complex eukaryotes, 
such as fungi, plants, and animals, all life forms have a sign repertoire to coordinate and 
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dinated cell processes within and between cells in nearly all situational contexts (Witzany, 
2010a, 2011, 2012a, b, 2014, 2017a, 2020; Witzany & Baluska 2012; Witzany & Nowacki, 
2016).
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gies bees use to coordinate their common behavior and to organize reproduction and food 
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merely metaphorical, and that bee communication systems have all the attributes of real 
languages, including a variety of dialects (Frisch, 1971).
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whether language use in communication processes is a rather exceptional phenomenon, 
or on the contrary, is the main characteristic of life (Witzany, 2019$&
ordinating interactions between cells, tissues, organs, and organisms. Figure 1 gives a 
graphic representation of the resulting theory of biocommunication.
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The genetic code: A natural language?
Molecular biologists characterize genes as representing a natural code, where transcrip­
tion processes from DNA to RNA, and translation processes from RNA to amino acids and 
proteins, as well as immune responses, and cell–cell communication are the essential 
processes of how organismic form comes about. These concepts were not introduced into 
biochemistry and molecular biology by linguists, communication experts, or language 
philosophers; they were coined by molecular biologists to explain observed phenomena 
(Nirenberg et al., 1965; Crick, 1968).
Nobel laureate Manfred Eigen insisted that the genetic code represents a real language 
and that the term “language” is not just a metaphor. “All the words of the molecular lan­
guage are combined to a meaningful text, which can be broken down into 
sentences” (Eigen & Winkler, 1983, p. 305). “At any rate one can say that the prerequisite 
for both great evolutionary processes of nature—the origin of all forms of life and the evo­
lution of the mind—was the existence of a language” (p. 314). Nonetheless, Eigen under­
stood language as it was defined by Chomsky, in terms of a context-free universal gram­
mar where the meaning (semantics) of any given language sequence is determined by its 
syntax.
Clearly, the nucleic acid language and the protein language are rather different from cel­
lular organisms that communicate with their repertoire of signs. On the other hand, if we 
take seriously the idea that no natural language speaks itself, just as no natural code 
codes itself but depends on competent social interacting agents, we have to identify 
agents that edit, modify, adapt, or generate genetic code sequences de novo. What are 
these agents, where do they live, and what are their main behavioral motifs?
Viruses and RNA networks act as natural edi­
tors of genetic text
Because they lack metabolism, scholars debate whether viruses can really be considered 
to be life forms. One thing is for sure, however: viruses contain many genes which are 
unique to viruses and thus not found in any living organism. Some virologists therefore 
suggest viruses predated cellular organisms. The number of genes found in viruses and 
virus-derived parts exceeds by a factor of ten the amount of genetic information found in 
cellular organisms. If we ignore eukaryotes and only consider prokaryotic life, we have a 
number of prokaryote viruses of 10 , which means if we were to line up the length of 
their virions, we would have a string of length forty million light years (Rohwer et al., 
2014).
One way in which we can conceptualize this finding is by understanding that the visible 
living world of organisms belonging to the three domains are embedded into a viral “dark 
matter” that we are only just beginning to examine (Youle et al., 2012). Most of these 
viruses and virus-like genetic agents do not cause diseases, but they persistently colonize 
31
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host cells and host genomes (Villarreal, 2005). When viruses colonize host cells, a key fea­
ture is that only a few persist as functional agents. In most cases, viruses undergo loss of 
function and in a later phase, these “defectives” are co-opted by the cell. Here they con­
tribute to all steps and sub-steps in cellular functions such as transcription, translation, 
epigenetic markings, repair, and immunity (Villarreal, 2009a,b; 2011a; Ryan, 2009; Villar­
real & Witzany, 2010).
There exist millions of types of viruses. Examples are bacteriophages, DNA, or RNA virus­
es. Particularly important for this discussion is the group called endogenous retroviruses, 
which are viruses that specifically infiltrate the genomes of mammals; and a subclass of 
endogenous retroviruses, human endogenous retroviruses, that are found inside human 
genomes. Besides viruses, there also exist a whole series of mobile genetic elements 
some of which might be related by common descent to these viruses, and others of which 
we do not yet know their evolutionary origin.
Many of these viruses nest themselves in the areas of the genome that used to be desig­
nated as “junk DNA” because these genes do not encode for proteins. However, today we 
know that non-coding RNAs regulate key functions in the cells they belong to. In the hu­
man genome, for example, approximately 2 percent of the genetic sequences code for 
proteins that underlie development and growth of the organismic body; the remaining 98 
percent is non-coding DNA that is nonetheless transcribed in non-coding RNA performing 
various regulatory functions (Witzany, 2010b).
This means that DNA is not merely a genetic storage medium serving as a heritable 
“blueprint” and evolutionary protocol, it is also a species-specific ecological niche. The 
human genome, for example, is colonized by retrovirus-derived retroposons and other 
mobile genetic elements, which in total sum represent more than 60 percent of the whole 
genetic content of humans (de Koning et al., 2011).
In sum, viruses and mobile genetic elements infect organisms and insert themselves into 
host genomes, thereby disrupting the existing sequence. They can, for example, delete 
existing host sequences, or they can multiply within the host system through a copy-and- 
paste technique (Shapiro, 2002; Shapiro & Sternberg, 2005). They furthermore change 
host genetic identities either by recombination or by the epigenetic (re)regulation of ge­
netic content, and many co-evolve with the host and interact in a module-like manner (Vil­
larreal & Witzany, 2015). In this respect viruses play vital roles in evolutionary and devel­
opmental processes (Weiner, 2006; Villarreal, 2015a; Roossinck, 2015). In contrast to ac­
cidental point mutations, their integration at various preferred sites is not a randomly oc­
curring process, but is coherent with the genetic content of the host; otherwise, impor­
tant protein coding regions would be damaged, causing disease or even lethal conse­
quences for the host organism. Such biological agents are capable of identifying se­
quence-specific loci of genetic text (Bushman, 2003; Mitchell et al., 2004; Lambowitz & 
Zimmerly, 2011). They are masters of the shared technique of coherently identifying and 
combining nucleotides according to contextual needs. This natural genome editing com­
petence is absent in abiotic life, and therefore represents a core capability of life.
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These examples show that the genome is not merely a molecular structure with a storage 
function, but rather an ecosphere habitat with an abundance of RNA-derived settlers such 
as retroviruses, competing for a limited resource: DNA. To get access to this limited re­
source some cooperative behavioral patterns have been selected whereby formerly com­
peting agents find a way to cooperate and to counter-regulate within the host genome. 
This newly emerging cooperation of formerly competing genetic parasites may lead to 
new features in host tissues, organs, or organisms, as documented in the various innate 
and adaptive immune systems (Marraffini & Sontheimer, 2010; Villarreal, 2009b). It is 
possible to imagine how different tissue types evolved in quite different species; this is a 
coherent event because of an abundance of persistent (non-lytic) viruses which share tis­
sue specificity rather than species specificity (Villarreal, 2009a).
The role of retroviruses in the evolution of the 
mammalian placenta
Up to one hundred genes can transfer to a new host in a single infection event. This is not 
a small step, as is the case with replication errors (chance mutations), but an evolution­
ary non-random drive with far-reaching consequences. An example relevant for mam­
malian and human evolution are endogenous retroviral infections that lead to the transfer 
of syncytin genes, which resulted in the evolutionary novelty of placental mammals (Perot 
et al., 2012).
The most active period of an endogenous retroviral transcription occurs during the for­
mation of placental tissue, during growth periods, and when trophoblasts join together 
(Villarreal, 2004, p. 314). Trophoblasts encapsulate the fertilized egg, help the egg nest 
properly, trigger processes that ensure nutrition, and prevent reactive responses by the 
mother’s own immune system. The egg is therefore protected by trophoblasts against an 
immuno-reactive response of the mother. These characteristics are unknown to 
monotreme mammals and marsupials.
In turn, the trophectoderm is a highly complex tissue that is, surprisingly, not of maternal 
origin, but a derivative of the fertilized egg. It develops before the egg becomes implant­
ed into the uteral lining. Experimentally suppressed expression of endogenous retrovirus­
es inhibits implantation (Villarreal, 2015b). This implies that implantation of the embryo 
requires transcription of retroviral syncytin-coding genes. In humans, the HERV W env 
gene codes for syncytin (Dupressoir et al., 2005), a molecule used by the host to join tro­
phoblast cells with the tissue that eventually nourishes the embryo (Villarreal, 2004).
Although these processes have been known for over thirty years, the purpose of this reac­
tion was previously unclear: it did not make sense that the evolutionary innovation of pla­
cental mammals was tied to the acquisition of a complex set of endogenous retroviruses. 
Since the trophectoderm is protected by the maternal immune system, it enables further 
growth into the placenta, thereby modifying blood flow and nutrient supply between 
mother and embryo. Once the sex of the totipotent embryo is determined, the high ERV 
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expression rates are stopped and DNA methylation functions again (Villarreal, 2005, p. 
325).
Microbiological infection events may also, however, lead to genetic defects also, perhaps 
leading to the loss of relevant tissues. As we will see later this means that such colonizers 
might also destroy important genetic sources, in turn driving the evolution of alternative 
capabilities.
The cooperative turn in humans
Viruses and subviral RNA networks also underlie key differences between human and 
nonhuman primate communication. Here we focus on the evolutionary dynamics that led 
to symbol generation and usage (Burling, 2005). Cooperation and intentionality are hall­
marks of complex nonhuman primate communication systems: but human languages are 
different. Great apes understand many aspects of social interactions in their life worlds, 
including causal and intentional relationships (Russon & Begun, 2004). But in contrast to 
human infants, great apes cannot participate in shared intentionality or cooperative com­
munication (Tomasello & Rakoczy, 2003).
The intentionality displayed by chimpanzees and bonobos includes the capacity for goal- 
oriented behavior, including the imagining of a possible action and its results, especially if 
similar situations have previously been experienced. We can characterize such goal-ori­
ented behavior as “cognitive” because a chimpanzee such as bonobo not only observes its 
conspecifics and the larger environment, but also employs inner simulation, i.e., self-ob­
servation (Hobaiter & Byrne, 2014). Although chimpanzees and bonobos use a wide range 
of manual gestures to communicate, they only communicate about real-life situations, and 
only in a context where communication leads to immediate manipulations of social situa­
tions (Graham et al., 2018; Bohn et al., 2016). Conclusions in the context of a great ape’s 
life refer to real-life or actual situations, not probable or fantastic ones (Byrne et al., 
2017). Apes do not produce gestures to draw attention to situations or entities that are 
not actual, or to inform another ape without intending to manipulate its behavior (Gra­
ham et al., 2018; Bohn et al., 2016).
The shared intentionality and social lifestyle engaged in by humans surpasses that of 
great apes, and human language requires higher-order theory of mind (Tomasello, 2008). 
Human social cognition is characterized by shared intentionality that brings forth cooper­
ative and altruistic interactions, potentiating new modes of cognitive representation such 
as making perspective-taking and symbolism possible (Tomasello, 2003a,b). Socially re­
cursive cognitive behavior resulted in humans not merely focusing on individual perspec­
tives but on the perspective of other group members (Tomasello, 2008).
This new form of cooperation based upon shared intentionality emerged from common 
goals and shared attention. Group hunting in great apes is characterized by each individ­
ual ape trying to catch the prey. This means the group behavior remains in the “ego-sta­
tus” for every individual. But the so-called cooperative turn in humans means that the 
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group members now act in a group perspective without “ego-status” (Tomasello, 2008). 
The decisions that are taken focus on group rather than individual benefits. This can al­
ready be seen in three-year-old children who have been shown to engage in cooperation 
in experimental situations (Liszkowski et al., 2009). It was demonstrated that the shared 
goal is so important that individual children who reached their goals early did not stop 
their actions until all the others had reached their goals. Similar behavior in great apes 
has not been observed.
Cultural background as collective intentionality
Culture assembles a totality of specific self-reflexive cognitive actions combining shared 
intentionality with knowledge of different perspectives on common goals (Tomasello & 
Rakoczy, 2003). This differs from great ape cognition which focuses on common goals 
rather than from an “ego-status.” With human-shared intentionality a new evolutionary 
stage has emerged. Individuals that act on their “ego-status” in the group now depend on 
each other by sharing cooperative goals. This crucially includes helping another group 
member by giving information that is beneficial for the other, but not necessarily for the 
information-giving agent. A central communication motif arises here: giving others useful 
information for their benefit. This new motif is not found in great ape communication 
(Tomasello et al., 2005).
Human groups now build cultural identities (self/non-self culture) with a variety of cultur­
al conventions, norms, and institutions that are not constituted by individual but by a cul­
turally shared background. This cultural background and the experiences within everyday 
life represent knowledge within a teaching process for future generations, which should 
integrate every new member from birth onwards into these norms of a specific cultural 
identity. Children are actively told and taught in an altruistic way to learn all these behav­
ioral motifs of the specific culture, to internalize them, and to become fully responsible 
members of this cultural group.
Language types no longer have personal connections with expressed utterance types. 
Rather, communicative conventions decide whether one uses a word in a correct sense or 
not. Now, every new member of the human species from childhood onwards (as a part of 
the cultural identity group) can learn a “universe” of conventionalized communication 
(Tomasello, 1999, 2014).
How did humans evolve gestures to draw attention to situations or entities that are not 
actual, and why do they willingly share information with other group members without 
the immediate intention to manipulate their social world? In other words, how do ges­
tures and vocalizations transition from being merely iconic and indexical to being symbol­
ic? As we saw, symbols are signs that neither “pick out” nor depict what they mean. 
Rather, they result from conventions that are memorized, learned, and used in a correct 
or incorrect way (Gillespie-Lynch et al., 2014). The use of symbols requires certain levels 
of abstraction: if humans speak about something that is not real, they extend time and 
space beyond the immediately present (Tomasello, 2003a,b; 2008).
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In summary, human language emerges from human communication, i.e., sign-mediated 
interactions as an essential means to coordinate and organize all common goals based on 
commonly shared conventions, understanding, and intentions. As we have seen, children 
in human societies learn how to use language by combining words and utterances within 
the context of everyday social life. The learning process is embedded in cultural tradi­
tions, based on local customs and traditions that include religious and moral systems. All 
aspects of learning are inculcated socially, because the meanings of linguistic utterances 
are not a private but social (Mead, 1934). There must have been an evolutionary pathway 
to the emergence of this capability. It has often been assumed that the evolution of sym­
bolization results from stochastic genetic mutations that bring forth an invention, an evo­
lutionary upgrade, so to speak, of existing capacities. Here, we provide an alternative 
view to explain the transition from iconic and indexical to symbolic behavior.
Social sensing in most mammals is determined by pheromone com­
munication
How do other mammals, and nonhuman primates in particular, learn social behavior? 
How do they acquire competence in social interactions, and learn their social roles in 
their community? How do they appropriate behavior that enables social integration with­
in their community? What are the consequences of single failures or repeated failures in 
social interaction?
The basic identity sharing system in animals, especially in mammals, is pheromone-based. 
Pheromones are intense odors brought forth by biochemical processes, for which mam­
mals have evolved the sense of smell. We know that the pheromone sensory systems and 
receptors are evolutionary very old, being essential communication tools even for bacte­
ria. Pheromones are key semiochemicals for identifying other animals. For marsupials, ro­
dents, or dogs, for example, urinary odor detection and odor marking is essential 
amongst competing males, and odor detection by menstruating females is of primary in­
terest for both males and females. While social learning occurs within all animal lineages, 
the social role of odor sensing is predominant (Villarreal, 2009a, 2011b, 2015b).
Mammalian social identification systems in addition are dependent upon maternal bond­
ing that occurs between a mother and her offspring. Placental mammals need obsession 
to nurse their young (Gootwine, 2004). In placental mammals the various pheromones 
that emotionally attach the mother and her young start at the onset of the very develop­
ment of fetus and continues after birth via lactation and milk. Pheromones, such as oxy­
tocin, vasopressin, or prolactin together with their cognate receptors play essential roles 
here. This fundamental social bonding system together with facial recognition (pleasure, 
fear, anger, etc.) and memory is very important and is not subjected to genetic variation 
processes during the long evolutionary periods. In other words, these biochemical sys­
tems are highly conserved. The increasing importance of social bonding correlated with 
neurobiological complexity (Kendrick, 2006), especially the learning of emotional plea­
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sure or emotional pain for social bonding or loss of social bonding becomes of importance 
for learning mammals in the earlier stages.
These findings allow us to combine empirical knowledge about neurobiological aspects of 
human language and communication with knowledge of basic molecular biological 
processes in microbiology in general and virology in particular, with the goal of under­
standing how recent research on viruses and subviral RNA networks that shape the genes 
and genome architecture of all living organisms is relevant for language evolution and the 
evolution of symbol use. The difference between the nucleotide sequences coding for pro­
teins (amounting to less than 2 percent of the total sum of nucleotides) of humans and 
their closest ancestors, the chimpanzees, is only 1–2 percent. These small differences 
cannot explain the enormous inter-species differences in behavior, cognition, and commu­
nication. Noncoding DNA regions that are transcribed in reproduction, which do not code 
for proteins but are for regulatory RNAs—are relevant in nearly all cellular processes. 
Humans differ the most from chimpanzees in the endogenous retrovirus colonizers 
(HERV-K), the long terminal repeats (LTRs), and the Y-chromosome (Kim et al., 2004; 
Flockerzi et al., 2005, Jurka et al., 2007).
The hypothesis I advance is that the primacy of pheromone detection was lost by some 
African primates, as a consequence of repeated steps of retroviral colonization of their 
genomes. The genetic alterations caused by retroviral invasion led to damage or even loss 
of the relevant receptors, olfactory genes, and related tissues; favoring a shift in domi­
nance to other sensory modalities, and in particular, vision and vocalization.
Genetic colonizers divided evolutionary pathways of primates
The neocortex of humans in comparison to chimpanzees displays a tissue enlargement 
that depends on stable alterations to the cellular programming and tissue (cell) identity 
systems involving ancestral neuronal stem cells. Only retroviruses have the capacity for 
such re-programming, as demonstrated in several tissues e.g., retroviral infection derived 
arc genes that are essential for long-lasting information storage in the mammalian brain 
(Shepherd, 2017). Virologist Luis Villarreal developed a plausible scenario from the virus- 
first perspective: an epidemic-like colonization by endogenous retroviruses took place 
within African primates that incapacitated the role of olfaction for recognition of group 
identity (Villarreal, 2015b). The primary tool to identify group members and their sexual 
and social roles in everyday group life was abruptly lost. The loss of odor receptors and 
related tissues was the result of several infection waves by endogenous retroviruses. This 
caused a dramatic loss of the major histocompatibility complex (MHC) olfaction (Kulski et 
al., 1999; Spehr et al., 2006; Doxiadis et al., 2008) and finally led to group recognition be­
coming independent from olfaction, which is the primary source to differentiate individu­
als of the (self) group and non-self individuals in all other mammals (Villarreal, 2009a). 
The loss of olfaction-based social recognition caused an increasing and probably abrupt 
shift to dependence on visual information, including gesture production and recognition, 
and vocalization.
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After the loss of odor receptors, determining social roles within groups and the language 
of humans became the dominant tool for social bonding. This means that the pheromone- 
based social bonding typical of other mammals in humans was replaced by a more com­
plex cognitive process. In association with language-based social bonding, the visual 
brain cortex must evolve relevantly because prior to language, body expression patterns 
that served as tools for generating coherent gestural sequences became most important 
after the loss of odor capabilities (Villarreal, 2009a, 2011b, 2015b).
The newly derived social bonding techniques via visual social interactions, accompanied 
by vocal complexity and differences in color vision, increased the (mirror-) neuronal com­
munication and its complexity in human social brains. The social brain, therefore, results 
from group identity procedures and processes (organization and coordination of group 
behavior). After the HERV K colonization of African primates, which reduced odor recep­
tion dramatically in humans, several other colonization waves continued, and further in­
capacitated the remaining olfactory-based identity (Villarreal, 2009a, 2015b). It is note­
worthy too that various behavioral instincts expressed by many mammals immediately af­
ter birth are also lost in humans. Humans, in fact, are the most helpless of all the new­
born mammals. They can only eat and defecate at birth without additional learning. But, 
in contrast to all other primates, human infants must learn fundamental movements. They 
cannot walk, crawl, or even lift their heads.
As a result, human beings are more and more dependent on learning from others, espe­
cially during their early brain development phase. Human communication and language 
were the primary tools for social group identity integration or rejection. The social brains 
of humans need complex language skills in order to transmit survival strategies to con­
specifics, to manufacture and use tools, and to learn the rites and rituals of the communi­
ty they belong to.
Designation of content that is not actually present by symbol-mediat­
ed speech-acts
Language freed humans from many biological determinants playing major roles in nonhu­
man primates, but the question of how humans invented symbolic language remains. The 
differences between human and nonhuman communication is based upon the existence of 
some kind of extended mind and on emotional networking that is grounded in recursive 
thinking and feeling and on the capacity to generate and transfer information to others 
that represents content which is not connected to actual situations. This may be a start­
ing phase for the origin of language-based conventional behavior, new vocal alphabets, 
symbolic signs, and sign sequences.
Designation of content that is not actually present needs combinations of gestures and vo­
cal sounds that a social community agrees upon in a conventional process, which is not 
the result of innate expression patterns. The pheromone-based semiochemicals and the 
main receptor of odor detection employed in nonhuman primate biocommunication, and 
the related tissues, are almost completely lost in humans due to the retroviral infection 
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waves. Therefore, facial recognition and conventional sign use that designates content 
that is not actually present empowers planning for the future, such as food storage tech­
niques (for winter) not for “ego”-status, but for the common benefit of the group.
Myth telling from the past and cultural traditions, such as group rituals as well as related 
cults derived techniques, such as painting and music became essential tools in the trans­
generational transfer of group memory and learning (Tomasello, 1999; Zilhão et al., 2010; 
Montagu, 2017; Hoffmann et al., 2018) Symbolic sign use in abstract alphabet use that is 
traded, learned, and memorized through generations dominates social life of early human 
species and selection processes.
Conclusions
Communication is a key characteristic of life in general. The evolution of symbolic lan­
guage based upon sign-mediated interactions in humans is at least in part the result of an 
abrupt loss of genetic determinants for identity recognition, and coding for odor recep­
tors and cells of related tissues. These persistent infections of endogenous retroviruses 
affected African primates in several waves and finally led to the divergent pathway of hu­
man evolution. Humans had to rapidly develop new tools to coordinate and organize 
group identity, group behavior, and social roles. Early human communicative gestures 
were followed by vocal languages to designate objects and action behavioral motifs (at­
tack, defense, mating, food gathering) even if—most importantly—these were not actual, 
but distant in time and space. This acted as a pressure to evolve linguistic conventions for 
conveying shared meanings, based upon a lexicon that goes beyond indexical and iconic 
signs to symbolic signs. As a successful tool for coordination and organization, that must 
be reproduced by social learning and memory in myth telling and rituals, symbolic lan­
guage emerged as a fundamental species-specific trait contributing to human survival.
Glossary
Non-coding RNAs
In any cellular replication process DNA sequences are transcribed into intermediate 
RNA to form the protein coding exon sequences. Some of the transcribed RNAs do not 
code for proteins and serve as regulatory RNAs such as transfer RNA, messenger RNA, 
ribosomal RNA, micro RNA, small interfering RNA, small nuclear RNA, small nucleolar 
RNA, and several other RNAs all being remnants of former infection events by genetic 
parasites (such as mobile genetic elements) that reached persistent status in host 
genomes. In, for example, humans only 1.5 percent of the whole genome sequence 
serves as protein coding sequences whereas 98.5 percent represent sequences that do 
not code for proteins.
Mobile genetic elements (MGE)
Genetic sequences that may move around the genome and even self replicate. MGEs 
are remnants of former infection events by genetic parasites such as viruses and their 
relatives.
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Subviral RNAs
Subviral RNAs in most cases are parts of former viruses that remain as regulatory ele­
ments in infected host genomes. Some term it “defectives” because in most cases they 
cannot reassemble to functional viruses.
Endogenous retrovirus
Endogenous retroviruses are viruses that persist within a host genome without caus­
ing disease. Some of them are coadapted and serve as important regulatory elements 
such as, for example, syncytin in pregnancy.
Long terminal repeats (LTRs)
Repeat sequences of RNA used by viruses to insert into a host genome. As coadapted 
genetic sequences they may serve later on in host genomes as essential regulatory ge­
netic elements.
Phages
Originally “bacteriophage,” this is a kind of virus that infects bacteria and archaea. 
Phages are the most numerous and diverse living entities on this planet.
Syncytin
Syncytin is an essential cell fusion protein in mammals especially in placenta forma­
tion and embryo attachment in the uterus. Syncytin is encoded by an endogenous 
retrovirus, i.e., a former infection derived retrovirus that reached persistent status in 
the host genome.
HERV-K
Human endogenous retrovirus besides humans is found also in old world monkeys, 
great apes. May be associated with cancer in testis but in the case of overexpression 
may have an immune function against related genetic parasites.
Semiochemicals
(semeion; Greek: sign) Are molecules that function as signs in communication process­
es and are produced by cells, tissues, organs, or organisms to communicate with oth­
ers of the same or related identities. Prominent example of semiochemicals are hor­
mones.
Major histocompatibility complex (MHC)
Cell surface proteins that functions in immune systems to identify foreign (non-self) 
molecules.
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